Table of contents
Right up to the breakthrough of modern physics at the end of the nineteenth century the most common scientific assumption was that the future would bring no radically new, basic scientific knowledge, but that the task of scientists would consist exclusively of refining and perfecting the Newtonian view of the world. Despite obvious discrepancies between experiment and theory in various branches of physics, science chose at that time either to ignore them or to presume that they could be eliminated within the Newtonian framework of understanding. However, the growth of modern science has demonstrated beyond any doubt that the sciences are not only developed through an accumulation of knowledge, but also that ruptures big and small are constantly appearing in the theories that make up the established view of the world.
Consequently, the most obvious places to search for new knowledge are in those scientific areas where there are discrepancies between the various conceptions of science.
The theory of science, which ought per definition cover all scientific phenomena, contains within itself a fundamental discrepancy: a lack of understanding as to what causes the division of the sciences into two markedly different categories - the natural contra the social sciences. The existing theoretical models are capable of elaborating theoretical frameworks in which both of these categories are described, as far as their sociological characteristics are concerned. But no model has yet been able to encompass these two basic scientific categories satisfactorily within a single consistent theoretical framework at the same time reflecting the marked differences between the two categories.
The theory of science has not yet provided any possibility of understanding the qualitative differences in "scientificness" that is readily discernible in the natural sciences on the one hand and the social sciences on the other. Until now, this lack of accordance as to what constitutes the basic structure of all science has functioned as a kind of cognitive obstacle that impedes further dynamic development, especially within the social sciences.
The prevailing theories of science.
The reader already familiar with theory of science will want to know what differences there are between this theory and the prevailing theories.
To describe the problems of the prevailing theories of science, and especially
the solutions to those problems, a conceptual framework which transcends the
existing ones is needed. That is precisely what this theory offer, so even to
the reader already familiar with theory of science, the easiest way to
understand the differences between this theory, Positivism/Logical Empiricism,
Hermeneutics, Falcificationism and Kuhns science-sociology, and the solutions
to their problems, will be to read the first third of this book.
Never the less it can be stated that the fundamentally new approach in this theory is based on the now natural scientific proven fact, that more than 90% of human brain activity takes place in the form of subconscious processes. This fact leads to dramatic changes when it comes to theory of science and of scientific understanding as such.
In order to discover what has caused the division of science into "exact" natural sciences and social sciences, it is necessary to incorporate a historical perspective. Thus, in sketching this theory I have focused on the fact that all the sciences, even those we nowadays regard as "exact" natural sciences, have undergone a process of development. In the past even mathematics, physics and chemistry, for example, have had a scientific structure similar to that of the social sciences today, and parts of the natural sciences still linger on that level.
This book sets out to show that the very categorisation of science into natural and social sciences has prevented us from taking the consequence of there being in reality only one type of science. But within this one type of science there are three essentially different levels of development, and the various scientific disciplines are themselves at different stages of development.
The fact that the so‑called exact sciences have once been on a developmental level corresponding to what we nowadays associate with the social sciences is important as regards the history of science. But even more important is the fact that the so‑called social sciences may be developed to the extent that they will in future contain the same dynamic and scientific characteristics as the so‑called exact sciences. We must bear in mind, however, that that is something very different from prematurely attempting to apply natural scientific praxis directly to the social sciences - e.g. from applying mathematical equations. The application of natural scientific praxis to social sciences will, on their present level of development, only contribute to blurring the limitations and thus impede the real developmental possibilities of the disciplines in question. The first step must be to clarify on which developmental level each and every individual scientific discipline basically is.
It is characteristic of the “classic” natural sciences that their structure today not only renders us capable of understanding the elements we have already investigated, but also of predicting - not guessing the content of elements we have not yet investigated and may not immediately be capable of investigating.
If the social sciences were raised to the same structural level as that of the “classic” natural sciences, something extremely dramatic would occur. When, for example, the theory in this treatise is applied to the scientific discipline history it will not only be possible to adopt a more rational attitude to individual historical societies and epochs, our own time included, but it will become possible to outline the fundamental structure of future dynamic developments, and in due course it will also be possible to predict future societal developments with the same precision as we are now able to predict chemical reactions resulting from the interaction of known chemical compounds! In trying to accept such a radical claim, please keep in mind that natural scientific predictions 2-300 years ago were as primitive as those of today's social sciences.
Thus it is the intention of this book to increase the understanding of the basic dynamics of science, and to introduce a universal theory of history which is capable of predicting future structural developments.
The constant driving force and motivating factor behind my entire work, however, has been an awareness of the urgent need of better conceptual instruments to cope with the historical, societal and environmental challenges we are faced with today.
It must be obvious to everyone that the natural sciences have enabled us to understand, manipulate and control our physical surroundings to an extent that no one would ever have imagined possible, even in the immediate past. It must be equally obvious that if we become capable of understanding the societal and social parameters in a like manner, our possibilities of stabilizing the world will be increased to a fantastic extent.
This treatise takes as its point of departure the basic assumption that the universe consists of one great interacting whole in which everything affects everything else. This applies not only to what we nowadays regard as physical phenomena we are capable of registering and measuring, but also to thoughts, feelings, and phenomena we have not yet fully recognized and understood. Remember that the phenomena we can register and directly measure only constitute about 5 % of the phenomena we reluctantly accept must be part of our existence - the universe!
An important consequence of this basic assumption is that it is not possible to say anything unequivocal about individual phenomena without describing everything in the universe - the entire universe. And since this is not humanly possible, we must continue to suffice with imprecise and approximate descriptions of more or less isolated parts of reality!
The cognitive procedure
The basic procedure employed in the scientific cognitive processes is in fact not anything specific to the sciences. On the contrary, it is a general mode of procedure we employ in our interaction with nature and with other people. The procedure encompasses feedback processes whereby the individual consciously or unconsciously formulates a question or need on being confronted with a problem. This is followed first by unconscious processing and then by conscious processing, ultimately leading to a tentative solution, which is then tested. Should the solution not prove satisfactory, the from the test newly reaped experience will then be used to reformulate the question, and be followed by new unconscious processing, conscious elaboration, a reformulation of the explanatory model and further testing, etc., until satisfactory results have been achieved.
It is important to note that one of the fundamental elements of the above procedure is unconscious processing. Thus, satisfactory results may well be obtained without any conscious understanding of the origin or internal structure of the problem. The initial interpretations and descriptions might very well be based on superficial considerations instigated by the specific situation or line of approach to the problem rather than by the problem`s fundamental origin or nature.
Thus, when produced by different activities, phenomena or processes which are in fact identical may very well acquire different descriptions and different names. A few centuries ago, for example, the same chemical processes could be utilized in the production of both medicine and perfume, but because these identical processes originated from different activities, they inevitably acquired different, more or less metaphysical explanations, and no one at the time had any idea that the processes were in fact identical. To give another example, the same mass psychological phenomena often acquire widely different descriptions, explanations and names, depending on whether they are described in a psychological or a historical context.
The main categories of science
The past century has brought about an explosive development in almost all fields of science, and a number of entirely new disciplines have been established. It is also characteristic of the past century that a gradual merging and overlapping of different scientific disciplines has taken place. The theory of science itself, however, has not kept pace with this development, and thus it is still not possible to provide consistent explanations as to what causes the differences in the nature of "scientificness" between the various scientific disciplines.
The traditional division of the sciences into two main categories - the social and the natural sciences - did not present any particular problem as long as the majority of the scientific disciplines were independent and isolated from one another and there were no great need for interdisciplinary interaction. But gradually, as interdisciplinary exchange has acquired greater and greater importance, the need for a comprehensive, logical and consistent theory of science that covers all scientific areas has become urgent.
With the establishment of such a framework of understanding for the entire scientific spectrum in view, it is my intention to argue in favor of establishing three scientific categories which reflect with greater precision the qualitative differences between the various scientific disciplines.
The systematizing-scientific level.
As already mentioned scientific disciplines are founded on societal activities. What initially turns these activities into science is not their content but the way that content is treated.
A couple of hundred years ago history e.g. was treated more or less like any other literary activity. Not until in the nineteenth century did history become a distinct science through the introduction of systematic and strict principles for the investigation of historical source material.
Although we may note that the transition, from the pre-scientific level of activity we regard as a framework of understanding for ordinary societal and artistic activities to a scientific framework of understanding is gradual, we can say that the systematizing-scientific level has been reached with the establishment of systematic and strict principles of investigation within the field in question.
The deco‑scientific level.
The cognition on the systematizing-scientific level is only capable of establishing criteria for systematic and strict treatment of the scientific material. Source material that fundamentally belongs to the same category might at this developmental stage both acquire different names and be interpreted very differently depending on the scientist`s or group of scientist`s approach to and understanding of the phenomena in question.
When it though becomes obvious that the scientists within different fields are dealing with the same phenomenon or problem, even though their descriptions and explanations of the phenomenon differ, the need arises to gather describe and co-ordinate all the acquired knowledge and express it within a single conceptual framework.
It is characteristic that it too is impossible, on the basis of theories formulated on this second scientific level, to predict any courses of events, apart from repetitions of the events leading to the formation of the theory.
After a scientific discipline has been established on this second level, which I henceforth shall call the deco‑scientific level, the systematic investigation may be continued, but instead of this taking place within separate and narrow lines of activity each with its own conceptual framework and "language", the knowledge reaped and coordinated from such different branches of a discipline may now contribute to a more general description and understanding.
Such a deco-scientific theory naturally endeavors to fulfil its task as a coordinating and organizing element as well as possible. But on this second scientific level competing theories are often advanced, each of which insists that its own angle of approach provides the best possible understanding of the phenomena in question. In reality each of the theories will cover some aspects of the phenomena better than others, but it is not possible on this deco-scientific level to determine whether one theory is more correct than the others. Consequently the dissemination and popularity of a theory on this level depends on a great many factors, such as whether it offends social, religious or ethical norms more than its competitors, or whether it is accepted by a new generation of scientists.
Even mathematics has undergone such a development, and although it took place thousands of years ago, it must have involved the same procedure - that of formulating a question or need, unconscious processing, conscious processing, formulating a solution, testing, etc. This must have led to the organization of the numerical, geometrical and quantifiable experience under systematizing‑(scientific) theories, in order later to be subsumed under a single deco-scientific theory - before ultimately becoming the qualitatively superior science it is today. (Such an archaic mathematical system still exists and functions in the north eastern part of Africa, a dynamic system based on experience that only recently has been logically understood and described with the help of modern binary mathematical understanding.)
As far as physics is concerned, the transition from the above‑mentioned deco-scientific level took place so late in history that we have ample historical evidence of this. With regard to chemistry, which is the most recently developed of these three sciences the transition from the deco‑level took place so late and in such a manner than it may well serve as an illustration.
As already mentioned chemical practices had for centuries been involved in the production of many different chemical compounds, but within the various disciplines different - and often metaphysical - explanations had been given of the cause and course of the chemical processes concerned. (J.D.Bernal)
About three hundred years ago, however, the application of chemistry and especially the instrumental practices involved had become so advanced that the need arose for an all‑embracing chemical theory, and several such theories were in fact formulated. The last and most successful of these chemical deco‑theories was the phlogiston theory, which gathered all known chemical phenomena within one theoretical framework. According to this theory, if chemical substances were combined in the presence of phlogiston - an undetectable element presumed to be universally present - then the respective chemical reactions could be observed to take place. It was necessary to assume the universal presence of this undetectable element phlogiston because at that time it was already possible to weigh and measure with sufficient precision to ascertain that when a number of substances were mixed or combusted, the total weight of the new chemical compounds obtained was different from the total weight of the original mixed substances. The phlogiston theory could be used to systematize, describe and coordinate chemistry before the different components of the atmosphere were known. It was not, however, able to predict hitherto unknown chemical reactions. The phlogiston theory was finally abandoned following the discovery, in 1774, of oxygen as one of the components of the atmosphere, but not until hundred years later, in 1869, did it become possible definitively to raise chemistry from the deco‑level to the qualitatively higher level of today, based on the development of the periodic table, and its quantum mechanical interpretation.
The deductive-scientific level.
As I have intimated, our interaction with nature and with one another depends on the continuous reciprocal action between our various cognitive achievements and the latter`s relationship to the empirical world.
Therefore the basic factors in scientific processes consist of our cognition and the empirical world. But as long as the cognition is restricted to “a descriptive and coordinating systematization” (the deco‑level) scientific investigations are often just repeating each other leading to quantitative development but with slight conceptual development. Qualitative scientific development is consequently relatively slow.
At some point however the vast Deco-scientific described material will lead a scientist to achieve a break through (by way of his 90% subconscious brain activity and subsequent logical thinking), raising the field to the level where it is possible to construct models capable of predicting the course of hitherto uninvestigated empirical aspects. These predictions can thereafter be compared with investigations of the empirical phenomena concerned, thus enabling us to verify whether a prediction is in reasonable accordance with the observable phenomena in question. If this proves to be the case, the scientific process has reached a qualitatively higher level.
At this stage it is important to recollect that due to “the interaction of everything in the universe” scientific unequivocallity is never possible. Consequently an acceptable coincidence between the purely theoretical description of a phenomenon and the subsequent investigation of the corresponding empiric phenomenon is the closest we can ever come to “scientific truth”!
Due to the belief that conscious, linear thought patterns and inductions were the only acceptable factors of scientific theories, other theories of science that have utilized deductions have been focusing on the fact that the premises of the deductions already have been confirmed through the inductive procedure. Or at least people have thought that inductions were "symmetrical" with deductions. If that should be the case the value of the deductive procedure would be eliminated by the circular reasoning employed!
Although it has been a general understanding for over 100 years within psychology, it is only during the latest decades that neurology, by way of brain scanners, has ascertained that approximately 90% of our brain activity is in the form of unconscious processes, therefore earlier generations of scientists have not been able to eliminate the above misconception.
The benefit from the deductive procedure emerges when new scientific assumptions leading to deductions partly originate from non-linear thought patterns (as they always do), and thus are not satisfactorily confirmed. In that case the deductions are not tied into a circular reasoning. The deducted theoretical consequences can be compared with empirical observations thereby confirming or invalidating the premises of the deduction. The deductive-scientific level has not been reached due to the expression of the prediction, as such predictions can be made about everything, but the deductive-scientific level has been reached when the prediction and successive other predictions has been confirmed through comparison with hitherto uninvestigated aspects of the field in question. This procedure is closely related to thought experimenting.
It goes almost without saying that the conditions and rules for the testing of deducted predictions have to be agreed upon before the actual testing is done.
In other words, as long as a scientific field is relatively undeveloped, it is only possible to pose relatively primitive and superficial questions. But ultimately, as more and more aspects of that scientific field are described, coordinated, developed and illuminated, the information available for scientists to process will eventually become sufficient to enable an open‑minded scientist to transcend the deco‑level and formulate a more fundamental scientific theory. A new scientific theory of this type will differ from its predecessors not merely by virtue of its ability to describe and coordinate its field of knowledge, but it will also differ radically from these deco-scientific theories by enabling the scientist to formulate models that predict and illustrate specific processes or phenomena within said science. It will then be possible to compare these models or predictions with hitherto uninvestigated empirical aspects. It will thus provide a precise picture as to whether the models deduced on the basis of the new scientific theory have as high a degree of correspondence with the observable reality as the technical proficiency at the time permits. Given a discrepancy between what is expected and what is registered, it will be possible, on this scientific level - which I shall henceforth term the deductive‑scientific level - to continue the scientific investigation with great precision in the specific directions rendered conspicuous by the lack of accordance between the theoretical models and the empirical observations.
The shift from the Ptolemaian system to the Copernican system constitutes the shift from the deco-level to the deductive level within astronomy, as only the latter system facilitates predictions and the subsequent control through hitherto uninvestigated phenomena. Within physics Gallilei established astronomy on the deductive-scientific level. Later the Newtonian system constituted the definitive shift to the deductive-scientific level within physics. And as previously mentioned, chemistry also presents a good example of a science that has transcended the deco‑level and has been raised to the deductive‑scientific level. The theory relating to atomic structure, weights and valency (the ability to cohere) is precisely such a basic scientific element.
No sooner was the periodic table and its quantum mechanical interpretation established than it became possible not only to coordinate and systematise the available chemical knowledge, but also to understand, calculate and predict the outcome of hitherto untested combinations of chemical substances.
It is important to note that a deductive‑scientific theory need in no way be definitive; it cannot in fact ever acquire that status on account of the interconnection and mutual interaction of everything in the universe. The definitive explication of a single scientific area is only possible as the collective explication of the entire universe!
Newtonian physics presents a good example of the imprecise and temporary nature of even an “exact” deductive‑scientific theory. Newton’s deductive‑scientific theories were so successful that they were proclaimed the only and ultimate theories of physics - and that belief did in fact impede further development of physics during the ensuing century.
We know, however, that scientific development did not come to a halt, for nowadays such disciplines as mathematics, physics and chemistry, which were originally three separate disciplines, form one interconnected scientific structure - to which other scientific disciplines are gradually being linked.
In order to distinguish this theory of science from other theories which also utilise deductions, this approach ought to be called "the verified-deductive method". Other schools notably "Moderate empirism" and "Falsificationism" which utilise "the hypothetical deductive method" have cognitively never really left the fundamental inductive approach of the neo positivists. Although they theoretically abandoned already established knowledge and inductions as the sole origin of scientific theories, they continued to see inductions and deductions as having the same logical structure and being "symmetrical", and thus tied into a circular reasoning. Furthermore in the practical applications they tend to focus on the expression of a theory as the establishing criteria for the theory and not on the confirmation of the theory. Last but not least those schools which maintain "the hypothetical deductive method" as an indispensable condition have hitherto had to dismiss the scientific achievements which cannot meet these conditions, and render them unscientific or pseudoscientific.
Although the name "verified-deductive science" would be the best way to express the difference between this theory and those theories which utilizes "the hypothetical deductive method" the name is too long for practical use, and I will therefore maintain the name "deductive-science" deliberately dismissing "hypothetical" in order to set it apart from the former schools.
The consequence of a stratified theory of science
The traditional division of science into the two main categories, natural science and social science, which in itself reflects purely historical and organizational relations between scientific disciplines, has camouflaged the fact that all scientific disciplines are in reality on different levels of scientific development.
The consequence of a stratified theory of science is that all scientific disciplines, whether belonging historically to the natural sciences or to the social sciences, are in fact part of the same scientific framework, despite their different developmental levels. The quite obvious differences in "scientificness" between the disciplines are not anything permanent; all scientific disciplines will in principle be able to undergo the same type of dynamic development.
Outside the physical/chemical complex, Johan Gregor Mendel`s theory of heredity provides a good illustration of the fact that a deductive‑scientific theory may well be developed in isolation. Even though the Mendelian laws of heredity were originally only concerned with a limited botanical field, they eventually constituted a basic deductive‑scientific element. From this basic element it became possible to predict the genetic variations that would evolve from the cross‑fertilisation of plants or animals with an accuracy that was satisfactory at the time.
Carl von Linné established botany on the systematizing-scientific level 1735, 259 years ago, Charles Darwin raised botany as well as zoology to the deco-scientific level 1859, 135 years ago, and already 7 years later in 1866 did Mendel`s pioneering work enable him to raise a restricted field of botany onto the higher deductive‑scientific level.
The deductive-scientific method will in fact first be effectively utilized on partial fields of otherwise deco-scientifically developed disciplines, but it is when a discipline as a whole is founded on deductive-scientific elements, that the discipline as such has transcended the deco-scientific level and has reached the deductive-scientific level. Once the deductive‑scientific level has been reached within a partial disciplinary field, it is in principle possible to transform (unwind) the entire discipline concerned. And when the entire discipline has reached the deductive‑scientific level, a partial disciplinary field where discrepancies occur can be investigated in order to pinpoint even more fundamental structural elements. The new and more fundamental theoretical elements thus derived will then appear as more generalized descriptions of the scientific field in question. Thereafter the original deductive‑scientific element can be regarded as a particular, simplified aspect of such a new and more fundamental deductive‑scientific theory.
Newton`s physics constitutes a good example of the above. As a deductive‑scientific theory it is still satisfactory for everyday use, but within modern science it is merely a particular and rather coarse aspect of the physics that is based on Einstein`s general theory of relativity.
In principle it is possible to explicate a deductive scientific theory in two different directions, one of which is to continue the investigation of the areas in which the theoretical model does not tally with the phenomena concerned, i.e. the areas where the theory is unsatisfactory. The other is to utilize or implement the deductive‑scientific theory in as many fields and for as many purposes as possible, and the majority of scientists are occupied with this latter sort of activity.
Often a new basic deductive‑scientific element will not become generally accepted until a new generation of scientists takes the lead. (Kuhn) When this occurs, the initial tendency will be to abstract from the weaker aspects of the theory and to concentrate instead on utilizing its possibilities. But the more the theory is utilized, the more its weak aspects are revealed, and the need for further research into the basic deductive‑scientific elements will become all the more apparent.
The term "natural science" has almost become synonymous with the term "exact science" (which in reality implies deductive-science), whereas the term "social science" has become a general receptacle for almost everything else, and this has greatly contributed towards maintaining the traditional division between the natural and the social sciences.
As already mentioned, a gradual transfer of disciplines from the social to the natural sciences has taken place as some disciplines have become linked to the deductively developed mathematical, physical and chemical scientific complex.
With the help of the conceptual clarification provided by the categorization into systematizing-, deco- and deductive‑scientific levels it is possible to determine to what extent individual disciplines within even the natural sciences are truly and consistently on the deductive‑scientific level of development.
If we take biology, for example, we find that despite Mendel`s deductive‑scientific botanical breakthrough, biology was still confined to the deco‑level at the beginning of the twentieth century. Mendel`s brilliant work had been overlooked and disregarded by his contemporaries and was rediscovered about forty years later, when the development of biology as such had reached a level that enabled many scientists to discern the pattern of this discipline's underlying deductive‑scientific structure. Although Mendel's deductive-scientific break-through came only 7 years after Darwin had established biology on the deco-scientific level, it thus took 47 years before biology as such became elevated to the deductive-scientific level.
As the result of the microbiological breakthrough in the latter half of the 20th century, biology has now become firmly established on the deductive‑scientific level, and present development within this scientific field points to a merger of biology and chemistry by way of biochemistry.
It is beyond the scope of this book to try to map out the deductively developed elements in all scientific disciplines. I have chosen biology as an example of a science that has now reached the deductive-scientific level. Medical science, however, serves as an example of a science that may well have reached the deductive level in some of its activities - and also thereby has become linked to the joint mathematical, physical and chemical structure - whereas other of its activities are still to be found on the deco‑level, and at a fairly primitive stage at that. It is naturally due to its extreme complexity and wide field of activity that the medical science embraces so different levels of scientific development.
Although a great many scientific disciplines have only reached the systematizing-scientific level, it is quite possible that some of these disciplines already embrace deductively developed elements that have not yet been recognized as such. This, as mentioned, was the case with Mendel´s laws of inheritance, which had to spend 47 years in oblivion before they were rediscovered, understood and recognized.
The preconditions for this deductive‑scientific theory of science
As a consequence of the division of the scientific field into systematizing-, deco- and deductive‑scientific levels, these categories should also apply to the field of theory of science, and consequently also to this specific theory of science. If this is a theory on the systematizing-scientific level all that is required of it is the establishment of systematic and strict principles of investigation within its field. If on the other hand this theory is a theory on the deco-scientific level it must formulate a hypothesis within theory of science, which can be used as a starting point for the description, co-ordination and systematization of the entire scientific spectrum. And if this theory transcends the deco‑level it must eventually be capable of making predictions which can be corroborated through observations within its field of investigation.
As a systematizing-scientific element within this theory of science can be seen the claim that all sciences ought to be strictly systematized, analyzed and judged using the same criteria. As a deco-scientific element can be seen the claim that three distinctly different developmental levels exist within science, and that the individual disciplines have to be described, co-ordinated and systematized in order to establish to which of those levels they hitherto have been developed. As a deductive-scientific claim, based on the understanding of the sciences as historically developing phenomena, can be seen the prediction that other sciences than those hitherto recognized as deductive-scientific can acquire that status. Furthermore the second and third part of this book actually undertakes such a deductive-scientific task within the science of history.
What this theory of science posits is that hitherto unrecognized basic
deductive‑scientific elements are to be found in sciences other than those used
in establishing the theory itself. It would be much too extensive, however, to
carry out such a process of verification at this stage, especially if one is
obliged to exclude disciplines that are to some extent already associated with
the combined mathematical and physical/chemical complex. So at this stage I
must confine myself to state, that I have knowledge of some reasonably well‑developed
deductive‑scientific elements in three markedly deco-scientific social sciences,
i.e. psychology , history and economics, the
two latter being dealt with in parts II and III of this book. In the chapter
"An alternative view of the science of economics" I will forward a
hitherto overlooked deductive scientific element. All of part III of this book
"The Future" is dealing with future historical development. If and
when these two hitherto untested theoretical structures are confirmed, this
theory of science has too been confirmed as a deductive-scientific structure.
(And as this treatise was published 30 years ago, several of the predictions have become reality, confirming the theory.).
As previously mentioned, a theory that has been established on the deductive-scientific level can be evolved in two directions, a quantitative one and a qualitative one, the first of which is to apply it to as many fields as possible, i.e. to make practical use of it. Since we are concerned here with a theory of science, this implies that in all scientific disciplines we have to determine which of their respective structures are in fact deductively developed, and which of them are still on the systematizing-scientific or deco-scientific level. The other direction, the qualitative, consists of investigating the basic elements of the theory, i.e. its foundation, a necessary stage in the further substantiation of the theory. This process aims not least to reveal the weaknesses of the theory, so that it will eventually become possible to uncover new and even more fundamental basic elements.
The two fundamental elements of this theory of science consist of the two basic components of the deductive‑scientific process, i.e. human consciousness and the empirical world, the latter being used merely to verify the achievements of consciousness. Consequently, if we are to deepen our understanding of the processes involved in the development of this theory of science, it is necessary to focus on the nature of human consciousness.
The foundation of the intellect
The human brain consists of two hemispheres, a left and a right, connected by an extremely thick band of nerve fibers - the corpus callosum.
The results of the past five decades of research have corroborated the fact that the two cerebral hemispheres are to a certain extent specialized. Whereas analytical, logical and linear thinking is the special function of the left hemisphere, the whole of the right hemisphere and parts of the left are normally devoted to perceiving things as a whole, i.e. to processing vast quantities of data simultaneously as one interacting totality. The results of this latter type of processing are thereafter expressed as pictures, intuitions, hunches and feelings.
The interesting thing about this research is that it has enabled us to acquire a deeper and more detailed understanding as to how the human brain employs two radically different methods of data‑processing.
Another approach to an understanding of the intellect is psychological. It is estimated that only about 10% of a person`s total psychological capacity is accessible in conscious form, whereas the remaining 90% is to be found in unconscious form, normally beyond the control of the individual`s will.
These different approaches to an understanding of the foundation of the intellect - via neuropsychology and psychology - are not contradictory, but simply illuminate the problem from different angles.
If we combine these two statements, we may conclude that only about 10% of the total psychological capacity is accessible in conscious form, and that the brain/psyche functions in two radically different ways.
A third approach has its origin in certain systems within oriental philosophy/psychology, and although they are not commonly known in our culture I consider them essential if we are to achieve a breakthrough as regards an understanding of man`s intellectual make‑up. This approach focuses on different levels of cognition and consciousness, which I shall attempt to clarify as follows.
The oriental philosophical traditions in question operate with seven different levels of consciousness. Although I personally find all of these levels of consciousness conceptually plausible, only the first three levels have any relevance here.
The first of these levels of consciousness is the crude level on which we regard everything as either/or, right or wrong, good or bad, etc. On the second level we regard everything as both/and, both good and bad, both right and wrong, etc., while on the third we are able to regard things as totalities: things simply are.
The following example regarding the sun may serve to illustrate what I mean by these three categories or levels of consciousness:
Under normal circumstances most of us are able to experience and accept the sun as a phenomenon that is - the sun is the sun. This is the third‑level view, and comprises everything we know, feel and experience as the sun.
Under slightly strained circumstances, e.g. when sitting in the garden on a hot summer`s day, we may experience the sun as too hot and somewhat unpleasant, though at the same time we remember all the cool days when we felt the sun to be warm and pleasant. On this level we have repressed our consciousness of the sun just being the sun, and have descended to the second level on which we appreciate that it is both/and - both pleasant and unpleasant, both good and bad. We are now at a level on which we split things up, although our consciousness still encompasses both polarities.
Under extremely strained circumstances, e.g. if we are outside in the desert under a baking sun for the third day in succession without any water, our consciousness is forced down onto the first level - the sun is evil, bad and killing - and we can only encompass this one‑sided conception. Similarly, if we were outside in a severe frost just before dawn without any clothes on, we would feel the arrival of the sun as an undivided blessing - as something singularly good and life‑giving!
According to our psychological situation, we slide up and down these levels of consciousness. But it is no accident that I have chosen the sun as an example; in reality it is only the most general phenomena that provide people as a whole with a means of intercommunication on the third level of consciousness. In fact the individuals capability of utilizing these different levels of consciousness vary widely with circumstances and individual psychological maturity.
Communication between several individuals is more frequently possible on the second level, on which the participants are able to maintain the consciousness of a both/and. But only a modicum of "extra strain" is needed before communication slides down onto the first level and the parties adopt either/or standpoints. If it were possible to reduce the strain, however, the parties would once again be able to communicate on the second both/and level, and might even reach the third level on which they were able to agree that the phenomenon simply is.
Another characteristic feature of these levels of consciousness is that, in a given field, a person on the first level of consciousness - one who is only able to see one side of a given phenomenon or problem - may believe that he or she is really on the third level. In other words, a person on the first level may be unable to understand that he or she is not in possession of the whole truth! Conversely, given a specific problem, a person on the third level of consciousness will be in a position to understand its division both into a second‑level both/and problem and into dual first‑level either/or problems!
If we now combine the above conception of the levels of cognition/consciousness with the previously mentioned neuropsychological and psychological standpoints we begin to realize that the logical mode of functioning is not merely a function of the left cerebral hemisphere, but is also to be understood as the simplest mode our psyche has at its disposal. And its very simplicity is precisely its strength, because by utilizing an either/or - 0 or 1, good or bad, right or wrong - the object of communication becomes unequivocal and accessible to everyone, and therefore universally communicable.
The fact that this logical mode of functioning takes place on the simplest level of consciousness is also its weakness, however, because reality becomes dramatically constricted as compared with the indivisible totality.
It is essential to bear in mind that although pure first‑level communication enables us to express ourselves unequivocally and precisely, a means of communication that is based on series of either/or, 0 or 1, such judgements provides no basis for putting anything into perspective, for skipping any stages, or adding new elements.
In exercising our cognitive powers we do however not merely draw on our (max. 10%) logical and conscious brain capacity, but to a far greater extent on our (90%) subconscious brain functions. The greatest part of our cognitive processes is in the form of subconscious processes that are able to register totality. But in order to handle empirical observations with precision or to communicate unequivocally with other people, we return to the basic either/or, 0 or 1, first‑level type of communication.
What we can conclude is that natural science is not the highest form of cognition as it is based on presumed unequivocability. It is rather the most basic form of cognition and thereby the universal form of communication. The very strength of science is that it is not limited by linguistic or cultural differences. The whole world can smoothly understand each other and work together through natural science!
The cognitive process
Remembering our starting‑point - that the universe consists of an "indivisible whole" - we can now establish that, as human beings, we are not merely capable of tackling single aspects of the "indivisible whole" - of moving laboriously, logically but unimaginatively up and down through an infinite chain of unequivocal logical deductions or reductions. Thanks to our subconscious brain functions, which enable us to perceive wholeness, we are capable of raising our consciousness to the third or higher levels where we can establish connection to wider areas of the "indivisible whole" and thereby tackle problems and structures of great complexity. Contact with these complex problems and structures does not of course take place at random, but is, on the contrary, the result of a process in which we more or less consciously formulate what we are seeking or need on the one hand, and subconsciously "correlate" this with our enormous wholeness‑perceiving brain capacity on the other. When, ultimately, the result of this subconscious processing rises to the cognitive surface in the form of pictures, intuitions, hunches and feelings, it is up to our consciousness to maintain these impulses from the unconscious, and up to our conscious thought functions to assess, elaborate, sort and communicate them.
In reality the unconscious expresses itself incredibly precisely, so what presents a problem is the limited ability of our consciousness to recognize, maintain, comprehend and formulate the impulses and answers arising from the subconscious rather than the quality of the messages received. In other words, it is no good approaching "the cleverest man in the world" if you can only ask him primitive questions, which he furthermore answers in a language you have difficulties understanding!
Man`s use of the first level of consciousness satisfies his need for unequivocality - an unequivocality that is to a marked extent an abstraction from and a simplification of the complex interacting reality. In practice, however, it has proved extremely useful as regards explaining intellectual problems. Moreover, since the unequivocal, though intrinsically unimaginative first level of consciousness is in principle accessible to everyone and thus immediately and precisely communicable, it is also extremely useful in science.
On the other hand, there is no doubt that the holistic mode of perception is in greater accordance with the conception of reality as an "indivisible whole". But since communication based on a holistic mode of perception is greatly dependent on individual experiences and forms of expression, i.e. for most people involves a high degree of subjectivity, it is not very suitable for general comunication and for scientific work.
Scientific communication on the deco‑level is a random mixture of communication on all three levels of consciousness. Thus a scientific theory on this level is subject to a high degree of subjectivity, and the extent to which it appeals to current ideological, cultural and political movements may well be crucial for its success.
On the deductive‑scientific level the basic elements of a given theory are identified and communicated on the unequivocal first level of consciousness. It is then possible to construct unequivocal theoretical models which can be collated with empirical observations, while subsequent communication on the second and third levels of consciousness will aim towards developing a greater understanding of the theoretical elements formulated on the first level. But the success of a theory on the deductive-scientific level might too be greatly influenced by subjective factors, as e.g. was the case with Mendel`s theory of heredity.
This seems a suitable point to note that it is not the intention in this book to consider other aspects of the epistemological and sociological problems in which every theory of science is enveloped. Such aspects as the sociological reflections presented, for example, by T.S. Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 1961) may be highly relevant, but they are subservient to the stratified basic structure of the theory of science described here.
If the reader is primarily interested in the social sciences, it could be advisable to omit the following sections, which are chiefly devoted to the natural sciences, and instead continue with the section entitled "Positivism, hermeneutics and falsificationism" on p.44.
The limit of deductive "scientificness"
This approach to a theory of science implies that everything in the "indivisible whole" can be apprehended and processed on different levels of consciousness. Consequently, although the "indivisible whole" cannot be fully apprehended on the three levels of consciousness employed here, but seemingly only on the highest level of consciousness (and by extremely few individuals throughout the history of mankind), the number of subjects or isolated fields that can be subjected to logical and deductive first‑level processing is in principle unlimited. In practice, however, there are rather narrow limits to our capability of using this consistent, unequivocal logical procedure.
Concerned, as science is, with isolated elements of the "indivisible whole", it is in fact illusory to believe in unequivocal scientific truths - and thereby in unequivocal basic scientific elements! But it has been found expedient in practice to identify predominating basic elements – “laws of nature” - and to abstract from all those other connections with the "indivisible whole" which we have not yet recognized or fully understood.
However, in searching for ever greater precision and insight in scientific disciplines, the limit of the use of consistent and unequivocal, logical procedure is reached at a relatively early stage. Because of the extreme complexity of the phenomena, the continued unequivocal practice would demand vast resources, whether it concerns the detailed investigation of relatively uncomplicated phenomena, or rougher, broader and more general investigations. In such situations it would therefore become necessary to leave the deductive level and continue work on the deco‑level. During the ensuing descriptive and coordinating phase it would then be possible, for example, to employ statistical data processing, thus making it easier to identify and accept new and more general basic deductive-scientific elements. It would thereafter be possible to resume unequivocal first‑level communication when new and more general deductive‑scientific elements are found, without appreciably disrupting the research or the cognitive continuity.
Thus in reality, even in the case of deductively developed scientific disciplines, development takes place by leaps, whereby we occasionally leave the deductive level. Only if it proves necessary and the resources permit do we carry out a consistent first‑level correlation between the new, generalized basic elements and the older, more primitive theoretical elements.
Thus in practice even within the “exact” natural sciences we frequently accept communication on the second and third levels, and a consistent first‑level correlation between the new basic elements and the old may not take place until many years after the new, more general basic elements have become generally accepted. This was e.g. the case with the correlation between the Newtonian physics and the physics based on Einstein`s theory of relativity.
When dealing with scientific disciplines which borders on to the deductive-scientific level, the challenge is to work with those aspects of the science in question which might be elevated to the deductive-scientific level. The second part of this book actually deals with the science history in that way, but at this stage metrology can be used as an example of what I mean.
Due to our understanding of astronomic phenomena, air flow, heat exchange etc. it is not only possible to predict that a new year follows this and that summer is followed by fall, but it is also, on the basis of complex theoretical models, possible to predict variations in major weather patterns. The complexity of the earth's weather systems however makes it, at a fairly early stage, impossible to use a singularly deductive-scientific approach in metrology, and the basic deductive-scientific understanding is then supplemented with deco-scientific assumptions and statistically based models leading to not fully understood patterns, and at last - before we through the media receive the weather forecast for the next five days, the meteorologist supplements and fine tunes the forecast with the help of his personal experience and intuition.
Thus a science can very well be established deductive-scientifically on one level, but due to the complexity of the involved factors, deco-scientific elements or systematizing-scientific elements may be utilized on other levels, and some scientists might even take to pre scientific explanations.
Logical unequivocality is not a quality of the empirical world but a level of human consciousness
Scientific activity consists to a considerable extent of creating sets of rules that can be used to describe, coordinate and systematize empirical observation, or of revealing seemingly unequivocal structures that can be used in the deductive‑scientific process. But just as this activity has contributed towards a deeper understanding of our surroundings it has also helped us to realize that even deductively developed sciences are based on structures of limited validity.
Although the very essence of science is to investigate the unknown, the problems concerned with the transference of individual cognition, to groups of other individuals (communication within the scientific community) has led to a drastic constriction of the cognitive field. Thus, the ability to formulate a problem on the lowest, unequivocal either/or level is regarded as the optimal form of cognition. The outcome of this view of science and its relation to the unknown is that often elements that cannot be explained or described within the given theoretical framework are dispensed with as irrelevant and disturbing.
This manner of disregarding so‑called irrelevancies is so widespread and accepted that in established sciences the problem of the theories limited validity is not particularly apparent. In less established scientific fields, such as psychology, this problem is more conspicuous, and in 1951 C.G.Jung described the problem under the title "Naturerklärung und Psyche" (Synchronicity, Routlegde & Kegan Paul, 1977).
However, with the advent of the new fractal geometry and chaos theory this entire problem is attracting greater attention and scientific respectability.
Thus we are faced with the theoretical problem that while on the one hand we strive for logical unequivocality, which we regard to be more real and scientific than other forms of cognition, we have at the same time to accept that by and large logical unequivocality is a fiction!
Although everything in the universe is interacting, the development of the natural sciences has on the other hand shown us, that it is possible to uncover (ever more) fundamental elements “natural laws” which enables us to understand and effectively manipulate whole fields of the empirical world. In order not to lose perspective and drown in information it is therefore expedient to maintain a Cartesian standpoint as the ultimate approach to science.
 The term social sciences will be used throughout as a common denominator for the social sciences and the arts.
 Kirsten Bergfjord ...
The status of modern physics within this theory of science
In modern physics it is Einstein's four‑dimensional, relativistic conception of reality that nowadays represents the deductive‑scientific frontier.
The criterion for judging whether a scientific theory is deductive‑scientific or not is whether it has a grasp of such fundamental aspects of reality as to enable us to elaborate precise predictions within the experimental field of the discipline concerned. The degree of precision being determined through investigation of the corresponding aspects of the empirical world.
Here the waters divide, for whereas both classic mechanics and relativistic physics satisfy this criterion each on their own level, this is however not the case with quantum mechanics.
The explanatory model for quantum mechanics is especially interesting in this connection, because it provides an example of how it is perfectly possible to obtain significant scientific results without the science in question having been established on the deductive-scientific level.
The traditional explanatory model for quantum mechanics as manifested in the so‑called "Copenhagen model" is characterized by its inherent dualities - dualities it has proved impossible to resolve on the given premises, i.e. to express on the unequivocal first level of consciousness. Despite the facts that quantum mechanics has (only) been formulated on the dualistic second level of consciousness, and that it is (at present) impossible to formulate precise deductive‑scientific predictions as distinct from highly qualified guesswork within its field, this branch of science has nevertheless succeeded in establishing itself to an overwhelming degree and has achieved magnificent results. As described earlier on it is perfectly possible within such a cognitively incomplete structure as e.g. quantum mechanics to develop isolated "islands" of deductive-scientific cognition which is capable of predicting events within its limited field. It is never the less to stretch such isolated cognition too far to use it as legitimation for the cognitive soundness of the whole quantum mechanical conceptual structure.
One of the consequences of the incomplete cognitive structure of quantum mechanics (the Copenhagen model/ the standard model) is that the investigation of the sub‑atomic field provides results that cannot be explained within the theory's own framework. It thus becomes necessary to append "internal properties" to each of the sub‑atomic particles that comes to light, i.e. ad hoc explanations that are not mutually connected. To me the question is not whether the dualities described by the Copenhagen quantum mechanical model really exist or not. For when the problems are regarded from a three‑dimensional point of view they obviously do exist, but it is highly probable that not only do there exist further dimensions than the three and four generally accepted dimensions, but that it will eventually be possible to resolve the Copenhagen model's duality within a higher dimensional context - a context in which the fifth and even higher dimensions acquire real content, and are not merely symbolic mathematical values devoid of cognitive content as is the case with e.g. The super string theories. The present super string theories claim to have expressed a mathematical theory which “nearly” unites the quantum mechanical field with Einsteins theories. This is done by operating with 10 or more dimensions, but dimentions that just are mathematical equations. To introduce such extra “dimensions” are the same as introducing extra unknown and uncontrollable elements devoid of meaning.
It is worth remembering that neither Albert Einstein nor Erwin Schrödinger ever accepted the Copenhagen Model as more than a preliminary approach.
“A navigational chart is one thing; sailing the ship is quite a different matter”. Just as three times three times three only acquires meaning as "something spatial" when we couple this arithmetical operation with our capacity for perceiving and understanding things spatially, four‑, five‑ or multidimensionality only acquire meaning when it becomes cognitively possible to accept these realities.
Paradoxically, yet understandably, the greatest obstacle towards a further development of the quantum mechanical cognitive field has been the practical success of the Copenhagen model. Why should we replace anything that already functions with something that might not be immediately useful!
Despite its imperfections, the Newtonian world view once reigned scientifically supreme, thus impeding further development of physics for a very long time, precisely because it was so applicable in practice. Not until the end of last century did a generalized expansion of the cognitive field definitively rupture the Newtonian world view. Whereas, in the case of the Newtonian world view, the expansion of the cognitive field was in principle linear, the situation is more complicated as regards quantum mechanics, because this has (only) been established on the dualistic level of consciousness and cannot therefore be regarded as a true deco-scientific, let alone a deductive‑scientific structure, as was the case with Newtonian physics. (David Bohm tried wholeheartedly though without success, to express the inherent duality of the Copenhagen model as separate deco-scientific theoretical structures.)
It is characteristic of the present situation as regards cognition in the natural sciences that it has been found necessary to operate with more than the four generally accepted dimensions. Cognitively we mostly stick to the three dimensions, however, and try to force the calculated four-dimensional reality into a three‑dimensional framework of understanding in which we continue to see time as an independent, regular progressive constant in nature.
A four‑dimensional intellect would necessarily regard a five‑dimensional reality to be just as radically different as a four‑dimensional reality is regarded by a three‑dimensional intellect or a three‑dimensional reality by a two‑dimensional intellect. To us a fifth dimension must necessarily seem incredibly odd and alien, just as the fourth dimension, time, would have appeared unacceptably odd and alien as a dimension to scientists of previous centuries.
However obvious this may seem, in practice we only accept the possibility of the four familiar dimensions and their inherent understandable phenomena. This attitude seems even more grotesque when we find that the advanced natural sciences, including cosmology, are compelled to accept the fact that what we recognize as the physical universe constitutes only about 1% of its matter. According to modern Big Bang cosmology, approximately 90 - 95% of the matter of the universe consists of dark matter -a concept which, like the 17th century Phlogiston within chemistry, is a cognitive receptacle for unknown phenomena observed to affect the physical universe, as the presence of dark matter can only be determined indirectly. At the present stage of scientific knowledge and cognition, to us it would be equally plausible whether this 95% dark matter should consist of hitherto unregistered elements in our 4 dimentional reality or of elements in a multidimensional context!
An established science is
characterized by its ability to investigate phenomena on the basis of specific,
generally accepted criteria, but if we wish to expand our basic cognition, we
must incorporate new elements, which in this case are likely to involve a
transgression of the four‑dimensional conception of reality, and to do that we
have to be willing to open our eyes to a lot of phenomena we have hitherto
neglected. To come to terms with a real multidimensional reality constitutes a great
challenge, but what we can do until this challenge can be met, is at the least
to take seriously those ”non-causal” phenomena whose manifestations are raised
far above the level of statistical chance. There are countless examples of such
seemingly ”non-causal” connections for those who venture to investigate them
scientifically - as described, for example, in C.G. Jung`s previously mentioned
work, Synchronicity. The phenomenal world of quantum mechanics, where
sub‑atomic particles suddenly pop up in or vanish from our three‑dimensional
reality, and where scientists mainly operate with sets of statistical rules,
presents in fact the most striking and thoroughly documented example of the
problem described above.
A thought experiment - a straight forward understanding of the fundamental particle-physics phenomena
Our three‑dimensional reality may be compared to a room. A room which by us is experienced as completely closed - nothing exists outside the room!
Contrary to our understanding our room have in reality openings into other rooms, into other dimensions, but we who are inside the room are not aware of openings, let alone of other rooms, other dimensions. Even though we are not aware of the openings into other rooms, other dimensions, we who are inside this three-dimensional room can nevertheless register that things suddenly turn up in the room that were not previously present, and also that things that have been registered there suddenly vanish. We can furthermore calculate the statistical probabilities for things turning up or vanishing, and we can also register "non‑locality", i.e. that certain of our actions are connected ”non-causally” with other events in the room!
Imagine a ball or something else in the room being hit and jump out of one of the (for us) unknown openings in the room (out of our three-dimensional perception of reality). Outside our room it interact with something and as a consequence of this interaction it influences something else in our room (by way of an opening) and that phenomenon will by us be perceived as “non-locality”!
Such a causal explanation incorporating hitherto unknown real dimensions can thus explain emerging or vanishing particles as well as the phenomena of “non-locality” and “entanglement”!
The seemingly strange
behaviour of subatomic particles becomes uncomplicated and easy to grasp as
soon as we recognise the existence of other real and important dimensions.
The facilitation of increasingly powerful subatomic colliders can be likened with a man using a sledge hammer in the pursuit of knowledge. It is obvious to us that a sledge hammer is not the best instrument to increase the understanding of delicate matters, but to atomic scientists that seems not to be so obvious.
It would be much better to take a step back and contemplate how all those delicate non-causal phenomena might actually fit together in a real multidimentional framework, instead of smashing up ever more transient subparticles.
In my opinion the Copenhagen quantum mechanical model/the Standard model, which is the established and predominating explanatory model for the sub-atomic field, is a shining example of a conception of reality that prevents us from appreciating the existence of a constant exchange between "our room and the other rooms", between our four dimensions and other real dimensions.
Our conception of empirical phenomena and their most formal and abstract description, the language of mathematics, can be formulated on the basis of the dimensional approach as follows:
It is possible to describe a limited number of empirical phenomena deductive‑scientifically on the basis of a two‑dimensional flat model, and to understand a broader spectrum of empirical phenomena deductive‑scientifically on the basis of three‑dimensional spatial models. It is also possible to understand a still broader spectrum of empirical phenomena on the basis of four‑dimensional, space‑time models, and in the future it will be possible to understand a still broader spectrum of empirical phenomena deductive‑scientifically on the basis of a five‑dimensional conception of reality, and so on.
As I have previously said, abstract calculations are not sufficient; we would also have to be able to accept the entirely different nature of a higher dimensionality and especially to be able to grasp its cognitive content and significance. That should however not be impossible since all of us already are in contact with a much wider part of the indivisible whole by way of our 90 % wholeness perceiving subconscious brain functions.
Classic physics operates with three dimensions, where time as well as gravity are regarded as constants in nature. Relativistic physics operates with four dimensions, where the space‑time continuity is regarded as an "indivisible whole" and gravity is a function of the curving of the space-time continuum.
The speed of light is still perceived as an "unbreakable" constant of nature, although our technical level has reached a stage where it is obvious that some phenomena are breaking the speed of light. As an explanation of this is not available within the existing framework of understanding it is just ignored, just like a multitude of other phenomena!
The speed of light and the other natural constants necessary to make our present understanding coherent, might represent bridges to new real dimensions. One thing is sure and that is that as long as we have to operate with elements which are not relativistic interchangeable with Einstein's four dimensions we are not really on the way to a Grand Unified Theory.
The astonishing results within sub-atomic physics has in actual fact led to a situation where the Cartesian world view (the deductive-scientific approach) has been given up and chaos and unpredictability has been accepted as inherent qualities of the fundamental reality.
Instead of linking new areas to the cognitive fields of Newton’s and Einstein’s theories, the comprehension of these areas are being dragged down on a lower cognitive level in the vain hope of establishing a Grand Unified Theory prematurely. Today's scientists have experimentally been able to unite the electromagnetic force with the weak nuclear force bringing those forces into a state of an “electroweak” force, and claim to be on the verge of a Grand Unified Theory of everything, but however admirable all this laborious brainwork is, from the viewpoint of this theory of science it is nevertheless like a Tower of Babel built on the loos sands of the inherent duality of the Copenhagen model!
Only the future and the scientists who eventually deliver the necessary cognitive and scientific breakthrough can tell which one of the natural forces will lead us to accepting a real fifth dimension of reality, followed by a sixth....! Thus the unification of the entire natural scientific field continues to be quite some way off.
Seen in a multidimensional perspective the "Big Bang" theory can be viewed as the way in which we manage to understand the creation of the material universe on the basis of our three and four‑dimensional conceptions of reality. In a multidimensional perspective the Big Bang model resembles a mode where we think we hear Beethoven's 9th Symphony as it is meant to be but are in fact only hearing the percussion instruments. The full orchestrated Symphony - the indivisible totality - is out of reach to us. Furthermore the Big Bang theory, which is based on a gravitational approach, might be wrong all together. It might be replaced by another cosmological model, e.g. the Plasma Universe based on an electromagnetic approach or some other future theoretical structure.
Whereas classic geometry satisfies the criteria for a deductive science, this is not the case with irregular-geometry. It may be possible in the field of irregular-geometry to find descriptive and co-ordinating characteristics enabling us to identify and categorize phenomena, but it is not possible to make predictions regarding concrete and hitherto untested aspects of irregular geometry. Thus from the point of view of this theory of science the irregular-geometrical models may be seen as an intermediary deco-scientific stage on its way to becoming a higher-level deductive-scientific understanding of the phenomena in question.
The irregular-geometrical field has hitherto been conceived of as representing a specific aspect of fundamental reality, and nowadays the attention of the scientific community is to a large degree directed towards uncovering irregular-geometrical/fractal structures in the empirical world as a whole.
As far as I can see, it will not at this stage prove possible to determine whether the primary organization of the interacting universe is in the nature of a multidimensional Cartesian system or whether it has an entirely different structure - e.g. a multidimensional irregular geometrical system with repetitive patterns which can be expressed as deductive-scientific cognition.
As natural science do not constitute the highest form of cognition, but the most universal form of communication the deductive-scientific formulated laws will in my opinion continue to be the “safe ground” on which we can continue to expand science and thereby our consensus reality.
Positivism Hermeneutics and Falsificationism.
This theory of science is to be seen as a respectful continuation of the pioneer August Comte (1798-1857) efforts to establish a rational foundation and systematization of all sciences, and as this theory is formulated on the background of more than a century of positivist efforts, it naturally also owes something to positivism. The most fundamental difference between this theory of science and positivism is to be found in the views on the origin of cognition. Positivists choose only to accept phenomena, which are directly observable and understandable (at the present) and consequently limit themselves to a very shallow understanding of cognition. Positivism thus ends up maintaining that new scientific breakthroughs are the linear product of already established knowledge/observations, - that is however not the case. Compared with what actually takes place within the (deductively developed) natural sciences, the positivist approach is in fact to turn the whole problem upside down. The logical consequence of the positivist reasoning is that deductions are tied into a circular reasoning process, as they depend upon "true" scientific assertions, which again are the result of inductions from already established knowledge/observations. In the first place scientific assertions are not the sole and linear result of inductions from already established knowledge/observations. Scientific assertions are thus not in any way "true". At most they can through testing be confirmed as being in reasonable accordance with observed phenomena!
This theory maintains that cognition/creative thinking/scientific assertions originate from a combination of already reaped knowledge and unconscious wholeness-perceiving brain activity, which can emerge to the surface of consciousness at any level of complexity and do not originate from unbroken chains of inductions. Inductions and deductions are thus not "symmetrical" and scientific deductions are consequently not tied up into any form of circular reasoning.
Furthermore this theory of science is not in agreement with the positivists fundamental aim of establishing unequivocal scientific truth, an aim which already David Hume (1711-76) invalidated. It is commendable, though, that the positivists themselves, through their struggle once again reached the conclusion that establishing unequivocal confirmations of scientific assertions was not possible.
Due to the present day situation where theories of science are derailed from the basic aim of providing a coherent and logical framework encompassing all scientific achievements it is appropriate to take a second look at August Comte´s 150 years old and seemingly obscure theory of science categories and derivatives thereof.
August Comte divided human comprehension into three categories:
1) The "theological" level where natural phenomenon is explained as arbitrary interventions by Gods or spirits.
2) The "metaphysical" where natural phenomenon are explained as resulting from unknown "forces", "qualities", "powers", "priorities".
3) The "positive" where natural phenomenon is understood to be the result of processes describable through natural scientific laws.
Although Comte recognized that science in the past had made use of the two first stages, he claimed that all scientific activities, in his time would reach the third and final stage of development!
After having developed my own theoretical structure, I have learnt that according to Milton Friedman in his famous paper, "The Methodology of positive Economics", also J.N.Keynes expressed similar but slightly different scientific categories. In Keynes/Friedman's words:
1) an art.....(,) a system of rules for the attainment of a given end",
2) a normative or regulative science.....(,) a body of systematised knowledge discussing criteria of what ought to be...;
3) a positive science.....(,) a body of systematized knowledge concerning what is;
August Comet’s categories were the result of the immediate and consequently superficial observation of various scientific disciplines approach to their subjects, consequently those categories do not express the underlying systematic procedures that are being used on the three scientific levels. As a result August Comet’s scientific categories have regrettably tended to confuse more than to clarify the dynamics of scientific development.
August Comet’s observation that the sciences develop through three distinctly different stages was correct, but in order to be understandable and of any use, those three categories have to express their respective methodological characteristics. Consequently I, as stated earlier, chose to call them:
1) The systematizing-scientific level.
2) The deco-(descriptive and co-ordinating) scientific level.
3) The deductive-scientific level.
Whereas Comtes` three categories were viewed as developmental stages of the human intellect with only the third category being scientific, all the three stages as expressed through my categories are actually deployed within science today.
By starting out with the assertion that all scientific achievements would reach the last, the positive stage of intellectual development in his time, Comte as well as later the positivists missed the most important point. The point being that some, notably the natural sciences had reached this third phase of development, whereas all the other sciences still lingered on the first or the second level of development. By systematically ignoring the first and second level and prematurely attempting to treat all sciences as ready for the "positive level of intellectual development", it became impossible to distinguish the radical difference between sciences which had reached the deductive-scientific level and sciences which were based on systematising assumptions (the second level), or just encompassed rules for the systematic treatment of scientific findings within their field of research (the first level).
To condemn the first and second phases as unscientific and only of historical value was a grave misunderstanding as most of the worthwhile efforts the positivists and neo-positivists have made through the years, have in fact been concerned with phenomena which are actually within these first and second levels of intellectual and scientific understanding.
To understand the many different attempts which have been made through the last
hundred years in order to establish a deeper understanding of the dynamics of
science, it is important to note, that most of these attempts have depended on
the very restricted psychological and neurological understanding available at
the time. In perspective of today's neuropsychological and depth-psychological
knowledge many of the past hundred years philosophical contributions to the
theory of science seem oddly out of place, but are naturally interesting in the
context of the history of science.
The modern branch of positivism "Logical Positivism" or "Neo-Positivism" was elaborated by the so-called "Wienna Circle" and "Berlin Society", whose major ambition was to establish a precise and common language for all sciences. This new school also missed the real characteristics of the deductive-scientific level of intellectual development, as, among other reasons, nearly all of the participants were deeply involved in the emerging quantum theoretical field, a field of natural science that was not and still is not developed to the deductive-scientific level. The fact that their own quantum mechanical field of science was not and still is not developed to “the positive” or deductive scientific level presumably lead them astray, just as Auguste Comte was let astray by his desire to prematurely raise sociology to “the positive level”.
The Neo-Positivist proposition: "Those statements are verifiable" / "from which we can infer predictions as to the observable behavior of physical objects". (Kolakowski p.215) were rightly rejected as it ascribes verifiability to any statement. The proposition was nevertheless on the right track, but lacked one further condition namely the confirmation of the viability of the prediction through the investigation of hitherto uninvestigated aspects of the empirical world. When this extra confirmation condition is included the possibility of verification is actually restricted to those sciences we (hitherto without really knowing why) have considered the highest developed. Within the theory of this treatise the proposition therefore can be phrased: "A deductive-scientific element has been established when theoretical predictions of hitherto uninvestigated phenomena have been satisfactorily confirmed through comparison with the empirical world". In the Neo-Positivist proposition the condition for verifiability is the expression of a theoretical statement, whereas the condition in this proposition is the confirmation of the statement through investigation.
As mentioned above it was highly regarded scientists who contributed to the development of neo-positivism. Therefore it is very remarkable that they did not succeed in breaking out of said cognitive dead end as they surely have known the famous anecdote from 1890, of how August Kekulé recognized the hexagonal ring structure of benzene. “One evening when he sat relaxed in front of the fireplace he saw dancing atoms in front of him. The dancing atoms gathered in a chain, and suddenly the chain joined together to form a ring”. This is a very obvious example of scientific understanding that comes from the subconscious and emerges to the surface of consciousness in the form of an image. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_Kekul%C3%A9
It may also be added that Russia's most famous scientist, Dmitry Mendeleev, who after many difficulties formulated the Periodic Table in 1869, was given the impulse to solve the problems that had hitherto hindered a rational design, after taking a day off and relax from work.
Furthermore Enrico Fermi
(1901-1954), while playing tennis, was given the impulse to bombard atoms with
neutrons, leading to the practical exploitation of nuclear fission.
In his famous paper "The Methodology of Positive Economics" from
1953, Milton Friedman expresses his view like this: "The ultimate goal
of a positive science is the development of a "theory" or
"hypothesis" that yields valid and meaningful (i.e., not truistic)
predictions about phenomena not yet observed. (page 7 II. Positive
Economics) In the paper Friedman as other neo-positivists displays a lack of
understanding as to the fundamental difference between the development or expression
of a theoretical statement and the much rarer possibility of confirmation
through investigation. That might again be due to the fact that such
confirmations have not hitherto been possible within the science of economics
that was his personal field of science.
Falsificationism that was created by Carl Popper in the 1930s has to be understood as a historic reaction to positivism. Seen in the perspective of the theory of science put forward here Falsificationism, as a basic theory of science, does not fulfil the cognitive requirements. Historic evidence reveal that Falsification is not the method through which new scientific disciplines have been established. When e.g. the Newtonian world-view was established it dominated for centuries. Although possibilities of falsification were readily available (through the theory's inability to cope with such vast scientific areas as chemistry and electromagnetism), Newton's theories were nevertheless seen as the ultimate scientific understanding and consequently not rejected. Only when a more fundamental alternative emerged, in the form of Einstein's relativistic physics, were the Newtonian theories dethroned. The same applies to the relativistic world-view which still is incapable of satisfactorily dealing with vast areaes within its field.
Seen from this theory's cognitive standpoint Falsificationism unsuccessfully tries to bridge the gap between the (deductive-scientifically developed) natural sciences and the (deco-scientifically developed) social sciences. If the demand for consequent falsification is maintained, as in the so-called "Simple Falsificationism" or "Popper (n)" school, the conditions for using the hypothetical deductive method can be maintained, but then only the already established deductive-scientific elements of science are encompassed. If the falsification criteria is just seen as a theoretical aim, as in the so called "Sophisticated Falsificationism" based on "situation analysis" or "Popper (s)" school, all scientific achievements can be encompassed, but the hypothetical deductive method has then been abandoned, and with that the only possibility to systematically test theories against empirical phenomena. The so called "Sophisticated Falsificationism" must therefore in this context be seen as a methodological regression, if the aim of a theory of science is to maintain as close as possible a connection between theory and the empirical world.
Although falsificationism as a fundamental theory of science must be rejected,
the falsification criteria can be seen as the second stage of the
deductive-scientific process, namely as the quest to further develop already
established deductive-scientific theories, which have been developed and
researched to the point where discrepancies between the theory and new
empirical observations become conspicuous. Furthermore, the Popperian
"rationality principle" can be seen as a deco-scientific assumption.
The "Popper (s)" or "Sophisticated Falsiofication"
approach to social science can thus be subsumed within the deco-scientific
framework of understanding.
Kuhn’s “The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions” is in my opinion not a basic theory of science but a
science-sociological model. As a partial element of any theory of science
Kuhn's science-sociological understanding of dominating paradigms ought to be
taken into account, and therefore also in the case of a deductive-scientific
theory and the further development of it.
On the one hand Positivism, Neo-Positivism and Simple Falsificationism have tried to force scientific fields that are only developed to the systematizing-scientific level or to the deco-scientific level into a form that is only functional for the deductively developed sciences. On the other hand in principle the Hermeneutic tradition regards all scientific achievements as equally valuable but the Hermeneutic tradition are unable to distinguish between different levels of scientific development. Sophisticated Falsificationism also tries to encompass all scientific achievements and becomes equally incapable of distinguishing qualitative differences. The Hermeneutic approach is in fact only fully appropriate for those sciences that are on the systematising-scientific level, and Sophisticated Falsificationism are as mentioned appropriate for further development on the deco-scientific level.
The Hermeneutic and the Positivist/Neo-Positivist approach can be said to be overlapping from opposite sides into the deco-scientific level, neither being able to distinguish the methodological shifts taking place when a scientific discipline develops from the systematizing scientific level to the deco-scientific level and further on to the deductive-scientific level.
The limited cognition of the above schools has led to the mentioned inconsistencies. To overcome those fundamental inconsistencies a host of more or less exotic philosophical capers have been tried. Instead of going into those more or less exotic details I find it sufficient to have pointed out the fundamental flaws, and to have established a consistent alternative.
The status of philosophy
within this theory of science
Theory of science is regarded as the domain of philosophy. So it would be reasonable, when working with the former, to touch upon the philosophical aspect.
As it appears in the previous sections, this theory of science reflects on the
one hand a materialistic point of view already familiar to most of us. The new
basic element, which is incorporated in this theory, is a neuropsychological
aspect that especially focuses on the sub-conscious character of creative
thinking and the stratified structure of human consciousness.
From a philosophical point of view this is a theory in which the dual concepts, mind and matter/thought and being, are regarded as identical in their essence, as elements of the interacting universe.
The consequences of recognizing that human creative thinking originates from a sub-conscious form of brain activity are more radical in a philosophical context than might initially be supposed.
The problem I wish to illuminate has been summarized in a lecture given at the University of Aarhus in 1980 by the historian of ideas and depth psychologist Jes Bertelsen, in which he pointed out that the most striking feature in western, as opposed to oriental, philosophy is that no original philosophical thinkers have ever been in agreement - and this is best explained by describing the context within which western philosophy operates. Jes Bertelsen summed up philosophy as the relation between thought and being. And the three main categories into which the generally accepted philosophical systems may be divided are those in which thought is subordinate to being (e.g. Aristotle, Hume), those in which being is subordinate to thought (e.g. Plato, Kant) and those in which thought and being are two parallel or essentially identical concepts. These latter may either be two attributes of the same reality (e.g. Spinoza) or separate, dialectically related dimensions (Hegel).
Jes Bertelsen pointed out that irrespective of whether a system belongs to one category or the other the problem will always be the same: we reflect on it, and reflection is in fact thought. In all such systems it is thus a question of "thought" thought, "thought" being, or of the "thought" relation between thought and being. The confinement of this entire problem to the domain of thought becomes even more apparent when we compare it with the scientific procedure. While on the one hand philosophy confines itself to pure thought, on the other hand the (deductive‑scientific) practice in the natural sciences enables us to collate thought with being or reality. No matter how much philosophers reflect on being - or on thought and being - they will never be able to establish a connection between the two of them. (It is not possible to connect being and thought in the natural sciences either; but by predicting a course of events that can later be collated with being it is thereby possible to determine discrepancies between thought being and observed being).
With reference to philosophical systems in other cultures (that more or less
specifically encompass the unconscious aspects of brain activity), Jes
Bertelsen regards the extremely one‑sided approach to the existential totality
in western culture as due to its extreme extroversion. It is characteristic of
all western philosophers (apart from Eckhart and Steiner, who are not generally
regarded as genuine philosophers) that they have resigned themselves to the
fact that we all think. Cognition is thereby restricted to the contents
of thought and is not concerned with the internal structure of thought itself.
With Logical Empiricism, which has striven to formulate systematic rules for the language of philosophy, philosophy can be said to be firmly established on the systematizing-scientific level. The establishment of a branch of science on the deco-scientific level demands a theory of science capable of describing, co-ordinating and systematising its total corpus of knowledge. And the categorisation of the main philosophical theories according to their conception of the relation between thought and being - between cognition and the interacting totality as done by Jes Bertelsen above, constitutes a deco-scientific basic element, however elementary.
The above mentioned lecture made me realise that philosophy is still on an
early deco-scientific level. Every major philosophical system continues to be
constructed on the basis of assumptions that are unique for the system
concerned, and in order to encompass increasingly wider aspects of reality such
systems are unfolded - in the shape of a pyramid or cone turned upside down -
from the fundamental starting‑point upwards towards increasingly more unfolded
and detailed elaboration’s. Each and every major philosophical system is based
on unique assumptions, and thus they are impossible to subsume within one
theoretical system. However, other thinkers whose theories are based on
different presuppositions may nevertheless find it inspiring to
assimilate the intellectual feats of their predecessors.
Philosophy is concerned with different aspects of thought and being. But, as Jes Bertelsen points out, western philosophy has largely refrained from investigating thought itself and confined itself to reflecting on thought. The chief reason why philosophy as a scientific discipline has landed in this blind alley (where a major part of its domain (thought) is allowed to fend for itself) is that it has only recently divested itself of psychology, which had previously been an integrated part of philosophy. And the task of psychology is, amongst other things, to investigate the preconditions of thought.
Psychology has made considerable progress in investigating man's conscious and unconscious mental functions, including the internal structure of thought. But it also suffers from the fact that it comprises many separate schools which have not yet been organized within a single frame of reference. However, the development of psychology during the last couple of decades is encouraging. The rudiments of such a common frame of reference have already made their appearance, and there is reasonable hope that these efforts will succeed in the not too distant future.
In the above‑mentioned lecture Jes Bertelsen intimated that cognitive progress lay within the confines of psychology rather than those of philosophy. I not only share this point of view but have also taken the consequence and based this theory of science on established natural scientific and psychological standpoints. Since psychological knowledge also borders onto metaphysics, it is not a question of eliminating the metaphysical aspect altogether, but of shifting the cognitive boundary from where philosophy today is confined to the immediate manifestations of thought to the domain of depth psychology - to the latter`s essentially broader and deeper understanding of the human psyche and to its experimental investigation of the internal structure of thought. Ideally, psychology too will eventually seek to describe as broad aspects of its cognition as possible on the unequivocal, either/or, first level of consciousness.
Psychology is a relatively new scientific discipline, and up till now first priority has been given to its practical application and development, while the need to integrate its various schools within a common theoretical framework with a common language has not been felt as acute. Even though it cannot yet be theoretically determined as to which of the psychological schools will come to function as a deco-scientific starting‑point for the psychological discipline as a whole, in my opinion the Jungian/Bertelsen depth psychology is an obvious candidate for this position. This school of psychology not only takes its point of departure in the deepest and most fundamental layers of the psyche but also encompasses the foundation for a coherent and logical theory based on the stratification of consciousness. This theory would enable us to describe, coordinate and systematize the cognitive content of all the other psychological schools as well. To use the Jungian/Bertelsen school as the starting point for a deco-scientific co-ordination of psychology does not imply that this school is superior to the other schools. The other schools might very well have better tools in the practical therapeutical and scientific work. What distinguishes the Jungian/Bertelsen school from the others, is its theoretical elements capable of structuring cognition, which the other psychological schools hopefully will fertilize with their insight and practical experience in the future establishment of a single deco-scientific psychological structure.
Just as Jes Bertelsen has indicated that the western philosophical tradition has largely failed to investigate the internal structure of thought, and has pointed out that any further understanding of the nature of thought can best be obtained by way of depth psychology, I too feel that the main currents of philosophy have placed themselves in a blind alley and that the theoretical understanding of the interaction between man and the empirical world must necessarily encompass a fundamental and up to date psychological understanding of man. Furthermore, I find it obvious that this latter must be founded on an understanding of the conscious and sub-conscious mental processes of the individual, and from there be expanded to comprise all the other psychological, sociological, societal and scientific aspects.
Consequently, even though it was not my original point of departure,
Jungian/Bertelsen depth psychology may be used as the cognitive basis of this
theory of science.
At this point some readers may feel that this theory lacks an ethical standpoint. Others may be sceptic as to what advantage deductive‑scientific cognition would be in the social sciences, especially if we consider how the increase in deductive‑scientific potential in the natural sciences has upset the global balance as regards resources, ecology and population.
If we view man/Homo Sapiens as static, presumably something of a similar nature would take place were the social sciences to become deductive‑scientifically developed. But as the following historical part of the book will show, in point of fact man/Homo Sapiens is a dynamic being capable of development and maturation both individually and collectively in society. The global imbalances might be lessened if we obtain better social scientific instruments.
The Jungian/Bertelsen depth psychology constitutes the theoretical basis for the above standpoint, and also contains its ethical foundation. However, a deeper understanding of depth‑psychological cognition requires not only a grasp of the theoretical structure but presupposes that the reader has undergone a process of human maturation during which he has directly experienced the viability of theoretical statements far beyond the boundary of what at present is linearly and logically cognizable.
The developement of history as a science.
Life and entropy
The interaction between different categorical structures
Concrete historical elements
The idea category
Initiative and idea exchange in firms and larger organisations.